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INCE DEREGULATION in the early 1980s,
crude oil prices have been allowed to move
freely with market conditions. Because of oil
supply shocks and seasonal movements in gaso-
line demand, retail gasoline prices often fluctuate
more widely than consumer prices in general.
Some analysts and politicians have criticized
these retail gasoline price movements, alleging
that they do not respond symmetrically to price
changes at earlier stages of the marketing chain.
In particular, they believe that retail gasoline
prices do not reflect decreases in oil and whole-
sale gasoline prices as rapidly and fully as they
do price increases. The shaded insert on page
20 contains comments typical of this line of
criticism. The perceived asymmetry in retail
gasoline price movements is of special concern
to consumers who believe that they are being
“gouged” by the oil industry.
Much of the perception of possible asymmetry
focuses on the relationship between the price of
oil and the retail price of gasoline. This suggests
1McKenzie (1991).
2An article by Solomon (1990), however, does point out the
potential rote of retail outlets. See ‘‘Gasoline Prices Resist
Crude Behavior.”
that oil producers or refineries are principally
responsihie for the asymmetry. In fact, a survey
undertaken by the American Petroleum Institute
concluded that 80 percent of Americans be-
lieved that oil companies artificially raised the
price of gasoline after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
on August 2, 1990.’ This statistic suggests that
many Americans believe retail gasoline stations
are owned and operated by the oil refiners. In
some cases this is true, but much of the gaso-
line sold at the retail level is sold through out-
lets that are not owned by the oil producers
and refiners. The fact that many retail outlets
are “independent” suggests that they have some
autonomy in setting the retail price. The role
these retailers play in the perceived asymmetry
is largely ignored, even though they are as
much a possible source of such an asymmetry
as are the oil producers and refiners.2 This arti-
cle analyzes the role that retailers may play in
the perceived asymmetric movement of retail
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wholesale gasoline price increases are passed
along to the retail customer more fully and




The purchase of gasoline at the retail pump
is the end of a long and complicated marketing
chain. A simplified illustration of how oil, after
undergoing refining,reaches the consumer as
gasoline is shown in figure 1. From the oil fields,
oil is moved to the refineries either by tanker,
pipeline, or a combination of the two. The re-
finery receiving the oil may be owned by the
company that produced the oil or may be in-
dependent. On January 1, 1990, 205 U.S. refin-
eries, owned by over 100 companies, were in
operation.
At the refinery, oil is distilled into a variety of
products including gasoline, home heating oil,
diesel oil, jet fuels, asphalt, kerosene and lubri-
cants. One barrel of oil (42 U.S. gallons) yields
about 43 percent gasoline.~Gasoline is trans-
ported from the refinery by truck, pipeline,
tanker or barge. Some is moved directly from
the refinery to retail outlets; some is moved
from the refinery to terminal storage areas
closer to final consumption. From these storage
3See Anderson (1984, p. 216).
areas, the gasoline is generally moved to the
point of final sale by truck. Once the gasoline
reaches its final destination before purchase, it
is usually stored in large underground tanks.
Refiners may sell gasoline directly to “end
users” such as large trucking firms, industrial
manufacturers and utilities. They may also sell
directly to retail gasoline outlets. Retail gasoline
stations owned by the refining company are
classified as “end users.” Retail gasoline stations
not owned by refining companies are known as
“independents.” As figure 1 shows, sales to end
users accounted for about 19 percent of refin-
ers’ gasoline sales, by volume, in 1988, with 17
percent of the sales to company outlets and 2
percent to other end users.
The other 81 percent of refiners’ gasoline
sales are made to either “jobbers” or indepen-
dent retail outlets. Jobbers purchase gasoline
from the refiners which they in turn sell and
distribute to retail stations and large users. Gas-
oline sales made by refiners to the non-company-
owned retail outlets and to jobbers are referred
to as “sales for resale.”
Several different entities are involved in the
pricing of gasoline as it is moved from the oil
field to the retail gasoline outlet. When oil is
sold to the refinery, the price for this transac-
tion is called the producer price. The price
























Oil and Gasoline Distribution Channels
the retail gasoline station is called the wholesale
price.’ The price the gasoline station charges
the consumer is called the retail price. The dif-
ferences between prices at various levels in the
marketing chain are called “margins.” The dif-
ference hetween the retail and wholesale price
4The price that the jobber pays the refiner is included in
the “sales for resale” price series used in this study.
is called the wholesale-retail margin. The dif-
ference between the wholesale price and pro-
ducer price is called the producer-wholesale
















Retail price movements are defined as asym-
metric if an increase in the wholesale price af-
fects the retail price differently than an equal-
sized decrease. Three types of asymmetry are
defined. The first deals with the length of time
in which a wholesale price change works its
way through to the retail level. For example, is
an increase in the wholesale price passed along
more quickly to the retail level than an equal-
sized wholesale price decrease?
The second type of asymmetry deals with the
amount of a wholesale price change that passes
through to the consumer. For example, does a
10-cent increase in the wholesale price lead to a
7.5-cent increase in the retail price, while a 10-
cent decrease in the wholesale price leads to
only a 5-cent decline in retail price?
The third type of asymmetry is a combination
of time and amount. The pattern of retail price
response may differ for wholesale price increases
and decreases. Although the retail price may ad-
just to a wholesale price increase and decrease
by an equal total amount and length of time,
the amount of adjustment in each period may
not be equal for price increases and decreases.
For example, in cases where the wholesale
price increases and decreases 10 cents per
gallon, retail prices may require two months to
completely respond to both wholesale price
changes. Assume the retail price increases and
decreases 9 cents per gallon in response to the
wholesale price increase and decrease, respec-
tively. In such a situation, symmetry exists with
respect to both the timing and amount of retail
price movements. The pattern of the retail price
response might be to increase (decrease) 7 cents
in the initial month and increase (decrease) 2
cents in the month following a wholesale price
increase (decrease). This pattern is symmetric.
However, the pattern could be such that the
retail price rises 7 cents and 2 cents in the first
two months for a wholesale price increase,
while the retail price falls only 3 cents in the
initial month and 6 cents in the second month
in response to a wholesale price decrease.
This pattern is not symmetric.
Since producers, wholesalers and retailers all
play a role in the determination of the retail
price of gasoline, the perceived asymmetric
price movements in the industry could be oc-
curring between the producer and wholesale
level or the wholesale and retail level. As noted
earlier, many discussions of the perceived price
asymmetry in the gasoline industry focus on the
producer-retail price margin. Such a focus on
the producer-retail margin tends to mask the
role that retailers play in determining the
producer-retail margin. Indeed, the perceived
asymmetry may as readily be due to retailer
behavior. In this case, simply observing the
producer-retail price margin would not allow
us to determine who is responsible for any
asymmetry.
Price-movement asymmetry has been found to
exist in several commodity markets, including
oranges, lemons, dairy products, some fresh
vegetables, pork and beef. In addition, the
markup of price over cost in durable and non-
durable manufacturing has been found to vary
over the business cycle.~Thus, a finding that
price movement asymmetry exists in the retail
gasoline market would not be unique. Many of
the works cited above indicate the importance
of industry concentration as a factor in explain-
ing the existence of asymmetry in these mar-
kets. Kinnucan and Forker (1987) note that
“because of industry concentration it is
commonly asserted that middlemen use market
power to employ pricing strategies which result
in complete and rapid pass-through of cost in-
creases but slower and less complete transmis-
sion of cost savings.”
GASOLINE PRICES AND
CONSUMPTION
The U.S. average retail and wholesale prices
of gasoline are shown in figure 2 for the period
examined (January 1983 to December 1990).
Several intervals of relatively large and rapid
wholesale price changes are shown in the fig-
ure. In early 1986, following the collapse of oil
prices, wholesale gasoline prices dropped sharp-
ly. In the spring of 1989, gasoline prices rose
sharply due “in part because of the temporary
closing of the port of Valdez, Alaska, at the ter-
minus of the Trans-Alaska pipeline, after the
Pick et at (1990), Kinnucan and Forker (1987), ward
(1982), Heien (1980) and Hahn (1990) all find asymmetry
in the agricultural markets. Domowitz et al (1988), Bits
(1987) and Morrison (1988) find asymmetric markups in
the manufacturing sector.I 23
Figure 2











‘Retail prices include federal and state tax.
Exxon Valdez oil spill in March.”G ‘The jump and
subsequent decline in prices in late 1990 are
associated with an OPEC oil price increase
prompted by Iraq in late July 1990, the subse-
quent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the world
embargo of Iraq-Kuwait oil. In all instances, the
retail price appears to parallel the wholesale
price quite closely. A more detailed and system-
atic analysis is necessary to determine if there
is indeed a symmetric response in retail prices
to a wholesale price increase and decrease. Al-
though not shown in figure 2, the wholesale and
retail prices of different grades of gasoline (pre-












exhibit similar parallel movements with
wholesale price changes.
Since the analysis below examines asymmetry
for different gasoline grades, it is useful to note
the relative importance of these fuels. The mix
of different grades of gasoline has changed sub-
stantially during the last 30 years. Prior to 1975,
leaded gasoline accounted for over 50 percent
of all motor gasoline fuel sales. Leaded gaso-
line’s market share began to decline, however,
after the enactment of environmental laws that
required automobiles to burn unleaded gasoline
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gasoline. Today, leaded gasoline accounts for
only about 17 percent of total motor gasoline
consumption, while unleaded regular and pre-
mium gasoline account for 59 percent and 24
percent, respectively.~
TESTING THE WHOLESALE-
RETAIL MARGIN FOR SYMMETRY
The hypothesis considered is that movement
in the wholesale-retail margin in the gasoline
market is symmetric. We test to see if decreases
in wholesale gasoline prices are passed along to
consumers as rapidly and as fully as are whole-
sale gasoline price increases. We test only for
symmetry in the wholesale-retail price margin
because the model used for this test may be
best suited for this margin. The model assumes
a markup method is used to set the retail price
of gasoline.8
To test for symmetric movements in retail
prices, we use a model in which the current
retail gasoline price (R,) is a function of the
wholesale gasoline price (W,); both prices are
measured in cents per gallon. This relationship
is summarized as
(1) R, = a0
+ a,W,.
The effect of a change in the wholesale price
on the retail price is
(2) R,—R~1
= a,(W,—W,j.
In order to examine how the affect of a
wholesale price increase differs from that of a
decrease, periods of wholesale price increases
and decreases must he separated.
Following an approach similar to that
developed by Wolfram (1971), this segmentation
can be achieved using the model
where
AR, =
WI, = W,—W,1, if (W,—W~,)> 0,
and = 0 otherwise,
WD, = W, —W,,, if (W, — W,,) < 0,
and = 0 otherwise,
e, = a random error term.’
All WI, are positive or zero and all WD, are
negative or zero. If retail prices respond sym-
metrically to wholesale price increases and de-
creases, then one would expect to find a,
In order to allow for lags in adjustment time, a
more general specification is
P q
(4) AR,= a~+ a,,~WI,,+ ~ + e,
where p and q are the specified number of lags
for the wholesale price increases and decreases,
respectively (p need not equal q). An intercept,
a’, could be positive, negative or zero and need
not be included on theoretical grounds. Follow-
ing Heien (1980) and Boyd and Brorsen (1988),
however, we include it to avoid biasing the co-
efficient estimates if the intercept is not truly
zero. This variable captures the average in-
fluence of all other factors besides raw material
price changes that influence the retail price.bo
Differences in the timing of price pass-through
would be indicated by differences in the num-
ber of lags for increases (p) and decreases (q).
The test of interest for the amount of pass-
through now becomes testing the equality
= X0a2,~.In other words, is the cumulative
7Based on volumes of first sales of motor gasoline in the
Petroleum MarketingAnnual (U.S. Department of Energy,
(1988)], p. 216.
‘This approach seems to more accurately represent the
pricing behavior of retail outlets than oil refiners. Refiners
with several oil products are perhaps more likely to employ
a more sophisticated pricing mechanism than the retailer
with a narrower range of oil products. One could make the
argument, however, that retail outlets also have a multi-
product pricing function, especially if the station is
associated with a convenience store. Dougher and Jones
(1990) note suggestions that tow margins on gasoline may
be offset by higher margins on convenience foods.
‘wolfram’s procedure uses the level of the dependent vari-
able, while we use the first difference of the dependent
variable. The model was also run for unleaded gasoline
using the natural logs of all variables. The results are
similar to those using the first-difference data.
101n some studies, a variable to measure changes in other
major marketing margin cost components, such as labor,
transportation and packaging materials, has been included
in equation 4. Preliminary estimates for this study that in-
cluded transportation wages and/or service station wages
showed that neither variable was statistically significant.
(3) AR, = a1WI, + a2WD, +
U FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOU1Seffect of a wholesale price increase equivalent to
that of a wholesale price decrease? If wholesale
price changes are fully reflected in the retail
price, we would expect to see ~a,, = 1 and
1. Symmetry in the pattern of retail
price response cannot be rejected if p equal q
and all a,~ = a2,~
DATA AND ESTIMATION
PROCEDURE
January 1983 through December 1990, a pe-
riod of relatively little government intervention
in the gasoline market, was chosen as the period
of analysis. Honeycutt (1985) notes that a
factor that influenced gasoline marketing,
beginning in August 1971 and continuing to Jan-
uary 1981, was extensive federal intervention in
the marketplace.’01 Furthermore, he notes that
“statements by several major refiners that any
changes in gasoline marketing would be phased
in gradually suggest that not all important re-
sponses to decontrol had occurred by Septem-
ber t981.”2 In order to allow time for these
“important responses” to have little or no effect
on the results, the period studied here starts in
January 1983. During the period analyzed, the
number of months with price increases and
decreases for retail and wholesale prices was
roughly equal across all grades of gasoline.
11Honeycutt (1985), p. lOB.
l2lbid,, p. 113.
13The unadjusted data are calculated by the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics and reported in the U.S. Energy Informa-
tion Agency’s Monthly Energy Review. These prices in-
clude all federal, state and local taxes paid at the time of
sale. For the period 1978 forward, prices were collected
from a sample of service stations in 85 urban areas se-
lected to represent all urban consumers—about 80 percent
of the total U.S. population. Service stations are selected
initially, and on a replacement basis, in such a way that
they represent the purchasing habits of the Consumer
Price Index population. Service stations in the current
sample include those providing all types of service (i.e.,
full, mini and self-serve). See Monthly Energy Review,
February 1989, p. 106. Retail prices are collected at dif-
ferent stations during the month of estimation.
14Taxes were removed from the retail price using informa-
tion provided in the U.S. Department of Energy’s Petrol-
eum Marketing Monthly. Federal and state motor fuel taxes
are reported by the agency about twice a year (generally
those effective on January 1 and July 1).
15Handling the tax rate changes in this manner could bias
the results because tax rate changes that occur between
reported tax rate changes are not accounted for until the
next reporting month.
16See the U.S. Department of Energy’s Petroleum Marketing
Annual and the Petroleum Marketing Monthly. This price
series is based on information provided to the Energy
The retail prices used are tax-adjusted U.S.
City Average Retail Prices of Motor Gasohne.13
The prices used were reduced by the sum of
the federal gasoline tax and a simple average of
the 50 states’ gasoline tax.14 No attempt was
made to interpolate tax rates between months
where tax rates were actually observed. The
most current reported tax rates were used until
new tax data became available.’~
Wholesale prices are those from data referred
to as “Sales for Resale.’bG These are sales of re-
fined petroleum products to purchasers who
are “other-than-ultimate consumers.” This series
does not include refined petroleum product
sales made directly to end users, such as agri-
culture, industry and utility consumers or sales
made by refiners to company-operated retail
outlets. Wholesale prices are reported exclusive
of taxes.
RESULTS
Equation 4 was estimated for premium, un-
leaded regular and leaded regular gasoline. Pre-
liminary estimates of lag lengths were selected
using Akaike’s (1970) Final Prediction Error (FPE)
criterion.’~The FPE procedure used to estimate
the “best” lag length requires the user to specify
a maximum lag length. For our data, the lag
lengths selected by the FPE procedure were
sensitive to alternative maximum lag lengths.”
Information Agency by firms responding to two separate
surveys. The first survey, EIA-782A, “Refiners/Gas Plant
Operators’ Monthly Petroleum Product Sales Report,” is
sent to a census of about 200 refiners and gas plant
operators. The second survey, EIA-7828, “Reseller/Re-
tailers’ Monthly Petroleum Product Sales Report,” is sent
to about 3,000 resellers and retailers. Some of the firms in
this survey are replaced on an annual basis. In both
surveys, firms are surveyed on a monthly basis and are
asked to report prices on a monthly volume-weighted
basis.
“Batten and Thornton (1984) note that the FPE criterion at-
tempts to balance the “risk” due to bias when shorter lag
lengths are selected against the “risk” due to the increase
in variance when longer lag lengths are chosen. Thornton
and Batten (1985) point out that the FPE procedure gives
relatively more importance to a lack of bias than efficiency.
They argue that the procedure is asymptotically inefficient
in that, on the average, it selects lags that are too long in
large samples.
18Maximum lag lengths of six, nine and 12 months were
specified in the FPE procedure. Results for the six-month
and nine-month maximum were identical, although the 12-
month maximum model chose longer wt lags (10 months)
for premium and unleaded regular gasoline. Lag lengths
suggested by the six- and nine-month maximum lag length

























Number of estimates t-value for t-value for
Type of months lagged Increase Decrease test of test of
gasoline WI WD ~a1, 0 - 0 ~a1, ~22. ~.a,, = 1 ~a2,= 1 fl2 D.W.
Premium 1 98’ .90 88 34 1 79 91 1 94
11828y 06981
Unleaded
reg.ilar 1 1 i.03~ 99 46 53 22 92 2 15
(1864) (‘764~
L.eacec
reguar I 2 10’ 1 05~ 49 1 70 80 .92 229
19o8~ f1693l
NoIc NLjrlters in parentheses are the dosolute vaces of the t-slanst Cs
lndica~esslats? cal s gn;t~cancc at the 5 percent level
After estimating the model with the lag lengths
suggested by the FPE procedure, F-tests and
t-tests were performed to see if any of the lags
(incrementally or as a group) could he elimi-
nated as statistically insignificant. Only the sig-
nificant lags are reported below.” Significant
first-order autocorrelation was not present in
any of the estimated equations.
liming Symmetry
The ordinary least squares estimates for equa-
tion 4 are summarized in table 1. Lag lengths
used for periods of wholesale price increases
were the same across all grades of gasoline; lag
lengths used for periods of wholesale price
decreases were the same for premium and un-
leaded regular. Leaded regular gasoline had a
slightly longer lag length for wholesale price
decxeases. These models suggest that wholesale
price increases affect retail prices for two
months (the initial month plus a lagged month).
Similarly, wholesale price decreases affect the
retail price of premium and unleaded regular
gasoline for two months. For leaded regular gas-
oline, however, wholesale price decreases affect
the retail price for three months. ‘Thus, the hy-
pothesis that the length of time in which retail
prices completely respond to a wholesale price
change is symmetric cannot be rejected for
premium and unleaded regular gasoline but can
be for leaded regular gasoline.
Amount Symmetry
Since the impact of the wholesale price change
on the retail price is distributed over more than
one month, the test for symmetry in the
amount of pass-through examines whether the
total response to a wholesale price increase is
equal to the total response toa wholesale price
decrease. In other words, is I a, = .1 a,-? The
‘=0
results of this test are shown in table 1. Fox- all
grades of gasoline, the cumulative response of
retail prices to a wholesale price increase is no
different from that to a wholesale price de-
crease. In addition, the hypotheses that
p
1 a, = I and la, = I cannot be rejected for
1=0 ‘=° .1
any grade of gasoline. This implies that whole-
sale price decreases are fully passed along to
“The reported lag lengths are those suggested by the FPE
criterion except for premium’s WI (for which the FPE pro-
cedure suggested a lag length of three months), and un-
leaded’s WD (for which the FPE procedure suggested a
lag length of two months).
Ctfl~OAi OCOCOIJC i~Ai%iii flC ~T I fli ICconsumers, as are wholesale price increases. In
short, the hypothesis that the amount of pass-
through in the retail gasoline market is sym-
metric cannot be rejected for the period of
investigation.
Pattern Symmetry
Even though the time it takes retail prices to
respond fully to wholesale price changes and
the total amount that retail prices respond to
wholesale price changes are symmetrical, there
is a difference in the pattern of response to
wholesale price increases and decreases. The
coefficient estimates for equation 4 are graphi-
cally shown, by grade of gasoline, in figure 3.
For wholesale price increases, the largest retail
response occurs in the current month for all
grades of gasoline. But, for wholesale price de-
clines, retail prices respond relatively little in
the first month, and make their largest adjust-
ment in the month following the wholesale
price decline.
20The initial month percent responsq,for a wholesale price
increase was calculated as (a,o/(I a,,[) 1*160
cent increase in the retail price during the in-
itial month, while a 10-cent wholesale price de-
cline leads to a 2.9-cent decline in the initial
period. For premium gasoline, there is about a
3.5-cent per gallon difference in the amount
that the retail price responds to a 10-cent whole-
sale price increase and decrease during the in-
itial month. For unleaded regular and leaded
regular, the difference is about 3.8 cents and
5.3 cents per gallon for every 10 cent change in
the wholesale price, respectively. Indeed, a test
for equality of the a10 and a,0 coefficients is re-
jected for all grades of gasoline, indicating asym-
metry in the amount of price response during
the initial month of the wholesale price change.
Wholesale gasoline price increases are passed
along more fully in the initial month than are
wholesale price decreases. The amount of the
total retail adjustment occurring in the initial
month ranges from 65 percent to 69 percent
for wholesale price increases, and from 22 per-




The Pattern of Retail Gasoline Price Response





Premium 64 34’ .29 .62’ — .16
114 39~ ~7.62~ (643) (11 57) (1 02)
Unleaded
regular 68’ 35~ 30’ 69’ - -— 08
114.97) (771) (641) (12 65) (~
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Using the premium gasoline model as an ex-
ample, a direct interpretation of the coefficients,
as reported in table 2, is as follows: a 10-cent
increase in the wholesale price leads to a 6.4-
During the second month, between 31 percent
and 35 percent of the total retail adjustment oc-
curs for wholesale price increases, and between28
Figure 3
Asymmetry in the Pattern of Retail
Price Response












































I 65 percent and 70 percent for wholesale price Domowitz, Ian, R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen. decreases. The hypothesis that a1, = a,, is re- “Market Structure and Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Manufacturing,” The Review of Economics and Statistics
jected for all grades of gasoline, indicating asym- (February 1988), pp. 55-66.
I metry in the amount of price response during Dougher, Rayola S., and Russell 0. Jones. Gasoline
the month following a wholesale price change. Distribution and Service Station Margins: An Assessment of
For leaded gasoline, a third month is needed EPA Assumptions and Implications for Methanol (American
Petroleum Institute, September 1990).
before the impact of a wholesale price decline is
rice. Fraser, R.W. “Uncertainty and the Theory of Mark-up I fully reflected in the retail p Pricing,” Bulletin of Economic Research (1985), pp. 55-64.
Hahn, William F. “Price Transmission Asymmetry in Pork
I CONCLUSION and Beef Markets,” The Joumal ofAgricultural Economics Research (1990), pp. 21-30.
This paper has tested for symmetric retail Heien, Dale M. “Markup Pricing in a Dynamic Model of the
gasoline price responses to changes in wholesale Food Industry,” American Journal ofAgricultural Economics
I gasoline prices. The results show that the length (1980), pp. 11-18. of time in which a wholesale price increase is Honeycutt, T. Crawford. “Competition in Controlled and Uncontrolled Gasoline Markets[ Contemporary Policy
fully reflected in the retail gasoline price is the Issues (Spring 1985), pp. 105-18.
I same as that of a wholesale price decrease for Kinnucan, Henry W., and Olan D. Forker. “Asymmetry in
premium and unleaded regular gasoline. Whole- Farm-Retail Price Transmission for Major Dairy Products,”
sale gasoline price increases for leaded regular American Journal of Agricultural Economics (1987),
• gasoline are passed along to the consumer more rw 285-92.
I quickly than price decreases. Although the time Mckenzie, Richard B. “Did ‘Big Oil’ Gouge Prices?” in which retail prices fully respond to increases The Journal of Commerce, March 6, 1991, p. BA.
and decreases in wholesale prices is the same Morrison, Catherine J. “Markups in U.S. and Japanese
Manufacturing: A Short Run Econometric Analysis,” Work- I
for both premium and unleaded gasoline, the ing Paper Series No. 2799, National Bureau of Economic
pattern of retail price adjustment is such that Research, Inc. (1988).
consumers will experience the bulk of a whole- Pick, Daniel H., Jeffrey D. Karrenbrock, and Hey F Carman.
• sale price change sooner for price increases “Price Asymmetry and Marketing Margin Behavior: An
than they do for decreases. However, contrary Example for California-Arizona Citrus;’ Agribusiness, Vol. 6, No. 1, (1990), pp. 75-84.
to the popular belief that consumers do not
benefit from wholesale gasoline price decreases, Shribman, David, and Miche? McQueen. “Office-Seekers
I wholesale gasoline price decreases are even- panies Over Spike in Prices;’ The Wall Street Journal, Revive 1970s Campaign Strategy of Bashing Oil Com- tually passed along to consumers as fully as are August 9, 1990. wholesale gasoline price increases. Solomon, Caleb. “Gasoline Prices Resist Crude Behavior;’
I
me Wall Street Journal, May 2, 1990.
“Oil Companies Bend in Wake of Public Outcry[
The Wall Street Journal, August 9, 1990.
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